A recent case in Ontario highlighted the importance of a well-developed amendment to the control agreement. In Fisher v. First Uranium Corporation[2], the applicant (a former employee) asserted that certain changes to the company`s board of directors constituted a sufficient change of control to trigger the change of control, which allowed him to leave the company with his lump sum payment. The agreement stipulated, among other things, that a change of control would occur if „the current directors no longer represent the majority of the board of directors.“ Although both parties agreed that the Board of Directors had undergone changes, they did not consider that the composition had changed to the point where the current directors were no longer in the majority. Following a thorough analysis, the Ontario Superior Court found that the applicant`s position was not supported by the evidence. Whether proactive or reactive, a well-crafted change to the control agreement should include details on the following topics: To gain the upper hand today in the change-of-control negotiations, Gourley says, „You better be hot things!“ Exchange-in-control agreements, sometimes referred to as „golden parachutes,“ compensate executives for job losses due to mergers or sales. Executives are agents charged with acting in the best interests of the company and shareholders. However, CEOs face difficulties associated with merging or selling the company, the end result of which will result in the loss of his position as an executive. Exchange-in-control agreements are structured to encourage executives to seek and open up opportunities for sale or mergers if it is in the interests of shareholders, without hesitation in losing their own positions. Finally, the „modified trigger“, which is also favourable to the company, requires a delay without reason or trift. However, the resignation of the executive only takes place during the „open period“ (usually 30 days) after a period of six to twelve months since the change of control. During this transition period, the company enjoys continuous performance. Like individual and dual triggers, the executive still enjoys financial security through the modified trigger system.

Like the interlocking statements of yew then in a complex table, the control modification provisions have become an important bargaining factor in management contracts. By establishing compensation formulas for different merger and acquisition scenarios, these provisions allow executives to set aside personal financial goals and focus on maximizing the value of a company`s shareholders. The following language is an example of a double change in control rules: at Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Call-Net Enterprises Inc. (2002)[2], the Ontario Superior Court characterized the amendment to the control agreement as a „protection mechanism“ for the company, which promotes the retention of senior executives and ensures their loyalty by giving them a financial advantage. , as the company undergoes a significant change.